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Co-Development in the Automobile Industry: 
A Case Study Testing a Win-Win Hypothesis1 
Gilles Garel — Christophe Midler 
Introduction 
For the past fifteen years or so, we have been witnessing the emergence of two contradictory 
trends towards change in the industrial world. On the one side, there is a trend towards 
vertical restructuring that forces corporations to re-focus on their core skills (Porter, 1982). 
On the other hand, there is a new approach to design processes, emphasizing close 
cooperation and teamwork between the various specialists involved in new product design. 
Changes in the automotive industry perfectly illustrate these opposing trends (Womack & al., 
1990; Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Midler, 1993). In an effort to reconcile the two, corporations 
are developing new practical relationships, often designated by the terms “design partnership” 
or “co-development”.  
The importance of this trends generates many ambiguities and rises questions on two axes : 
first on the precise practices behind the so-called «partnership» relationships; many researches 
(Lamming, 1993; Liker & al., 1995; Midler & al., 1997) try to define more precisely these notions and 
then characterise the depth and the scope of the changes in the industrial practices.  
second on the result of such changes for the car makers and the suppliers involved. The general 
discourse about partnership is that such practices are founded on a «win-win game» hypothesis. There 
is far less empirical analysis to confirm – nor infirm- this hypothesis, especially on the supplier’s side.  
In this chapter, we will attempt to provide answers to these questions, basing our conclusions 
on a case-study of co-development in the die tool development for the automotive industry. 
The research was a comparizon between two similar projects that adopt different types of 
supplier-constructor relations (one «traditionnal», one «co-development»).  
This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first, we define the concept of “co-
development,” a term we prefer to “partnership”. We analyse on the case how these principles 
where implemented and what was the consequences in the differences in the development 
process between traditionnal and co-development project. In the second, we explain the 
methods used in comparing co-development with the traditional method. In the third section, 
we present the results of this analysis. As will become apparent, these results substantiate the 
hypothesis of a “win-win” situation between customer and supplier, although not all suppliers 
reaped the same benefits. In the fourth and final section, we discuss our results through an 
analysis of the advantages accruing from co-development in terms of two variables: supplier 
engineering skills; and long-term stability of the auto-maker/supplier relationship. This 
analysis reveals the need for systematic integration into the theoretical design-performance 
model of incentive and cognitive factors. 
This article is based on interactive research conducted on the premises of the auto-maker over 
a period of five years (Garel, 1994). The study is part of a joint research program conducted 
by the CRG since early 1990 for the purpose of analysing current shifts in design and 
engineering processes in a variety of industrial contexts: automotive, chemicals, construction, 
pharmaceuticals, electronics and defence. The research was conducted on the premises of a 
European mass-market auto-maker, and of a representative sample of the company’s 
stamping-tool suppliers. It was made at the joint request of the auto-maker’s purchasing and 
methods departments. Following the out-location of stamping operations in the early 1990s, 
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this auto-maker, which we will refer to as “X,” wished to evaluate its new partnerships with 
suppliers. In the context of a study conducted over a period of two years, we were able to 
cross-analyse the viewpoints of both the customer and its suppliers. In order to assess the 
profits and losses generated by co-development, we did a comparative study of two 
automotive projects: a TR (Traditional) project, conducted without co-development in the late 
1980s, and a more recent CD (Co-Development) project, pioneered jointly with the tool-
makers. We chose to analyse the performance of four European tool-makers (A, B, C, D) 
participating in both the TR and CD projects. The field study was conducted in two phases. 
From December 1995 to July 1996 we worked from data collected at the auto-maker’s. The 
suppliers’ study was conducted from January to July 1997. We drew on internal data collected 
from Auto-Maker X and its suppliers (files, reports, notes, etc.); on re-assessments made at 
our request (submitted by the firms); on interviews (over thirty); and on regular cross-
checking carried out by the steering committee of the interactive research (Girin, 1990, p. 
197). 
1. A co-development characterisation 
To the rather loose and conoted «partnership» notion, we will prefer the more restrictive term 
“co-development” thus highlighting the fact that, within the customer-supplier relationship, 
we are focussing on new product and/or process design. More precisely, following the lines 
laid down by a previous study (Midler & al., 1997), we have chosen to define “co-
development” in terms of five conditioning factors. The idea being that codevelopment 
efficiency is the result of a global coherency of this set of variables, including definition of 
tasks, collective design methodologies and contracting rules. This characterisation is 
consistant with those Lamming (1993) and Liker & al., (1995).  
The early selection of a supplier, based on strategic criteria, for a cooperative endeavor 
lasting throughout the duration of the development process 
For co-development, the customer-supplier relationship is formed at the beginning of the 
design process—during the preliminary study phase. For traditional customer-supplier sub-
contracting, on the other hand, this relationship is established only after the technical 
definition of the new product has been completed, at which point the supplier submitting the 
lowest bid is selected. For co-development, selection is made on the basis of positive previous 
experience with the supplier, and on the customer’s long-term strategic objectives. Cost 
bidding—the decisive factor under the traditional system—is here deemed to be less 
important than compatibility between the customer’s strategy and the perceived skills of the 
supplier. The customer’s trust in the supplier and the supplier’s reputation also play a role. 
Approved suppliers are consulted on overall functional objectives (desired level of 
performance, price objective, etc.). Here, exact technical specifications no longer serve as the 
point of departure for the customer-supplier collaboration but, on the contrary, are generated 
by it. The contract is signed only after a period of inter-corporate exchanges during which the 
supplier evaluates the technical feasibility of the proposed development and estimates the 
profit potential for its own firm. The customer initiates exchanges with several firms (the 
“parallel sourcing” concept:  Richardson, 1993).  
The die tools development includes two phases : phase 1 is design period and ends to a 
technical specification freeze of the tool. Phase two is a production period of the tools. The 
difference in suppliers’s involvment in TR and CD projects illustrate clearly our first co-
development criteria. 
PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PROJET TR
PROJET CD
Supplier involument
Supplier involument Temps
PHASE 1 (plateau) PHASE 2
 
Figure 1: Co-development and the extended supplier time- frame 
Phase 1 lasted 4 months on Project TR compared with 18 months on Project CD. Phase 2, on 
the contrary, was shorter in Project CD. This new time-frame has been defined as «front 
loading strategies» by Thomke & Fujimoto, (1998). It has been further extended for more 
recent projects. 
Supplier involvement affecting a broader operational perimeter 
Co-development implies a shift from basic-component supply to transactions involving 
complete vehicle sub-systems. For example, in the case of car seats, auto-makers formerly 
purchased the metal frames, foam filling, and upholstery fabric separately; and then 
assembled the seat. Under co-development, the supplier provides the complete “system”. This 
broader scope also affects development-cycle operations. Suppliers assume increased 
responsibility for technical design, process specifications, testing, etc. In the metal-stamping 
field, assignments to tool-makers are today made by the total lot, and are based on the 
physical perimeters defining an entire system (for example, all the stamped pieces for a door); 
whereas, formerly, assignments were made component-by-component and awarded to the 
lowest bidder. On our CD project, 83% of the components in a lot were assigned to the same 
supplier, as compared to 43% on the TR project. This way, interface problems between 
individual components (the geometric fit and visual appeal of the body as a whole) are all 
handled by the same supplier. 
The supplier’s commitment to an overall result, measured in terms of quality, cost, and time 
In co-development, the supplier’s commitment covers the total design / testing / production / 
delivery process. The customer must be certain that the supplier will use its significant margin 
of manoeuvre to carry out the co-development project in the direction initially planned. 
Contractual incentives and sanctions are specified. If difficulties arise, the supplier may risk 
paying a penalty, losing orders, or failing to be selected as the co-developer on other projects. 
Adoption of joined development methodologies focussed on front-loading and learning. 
Traditional sub-contracting practice focussed on stipulating the rewards, penalties, and 
conditions of the relationship as explicitly as possible in the initial contract. However, a 
design process inevitably involves unforeseen problems, and modifications not included in the 
original specifications. The skills which need to be mobilized for a design operation are hard 
to define and coordinate (Schön, 1983; Nonaka, 1994). It is therefore crucial to identify 
problems quickly, to formulate possible solutions jointly, to implement them, and to optimize 
the elimination of decision-making inertia when effecting the required modifications. During 
the course of the project, the proposals made by the various players in the design process must 
be open to coordination and revision. Suppliers must also be able to demonstrate that the 
objectives specified in the contract concluded with the customer are tenable. Under co-
development, suppliers cannot play a passive role, merely reacting to customer inspections. 
On the contrary, they have to seize the initiative and ensure that responsibility for the agreed 
result can be undertaken successfully. It is the supplier’s duty to identify potential trouble-
spots and to alert the customer if need be. This approach depends on suppliers being able to 
anticipate and identify problems encountered following the inception of the project. An 
agreement between two firms does not have to be exhaustive, but it must be consistent in 
terms of joint work procedures and the means for dealing with unexpected problems or 
revised objectives. 
The integration of economic and technical imperatives 
This integration is twofold. First, under co-development, economic negotiation ceases to be an 
isolated event and becomes a process of building value through the design process (during 
which technical variants are costed, the effects of modifications evaluated, etc.), whereas 
there is a clear separation between economic negotiation and technical design under the 
traditional customer-supplier relationship. Traditional projects separate the players from each 
other (the economic contract is formulated by purchasing agents who are largely cut off from 
the engineering arena of manufacturers), and involve temporal dissociation as well. Under 
traditional projects, a bid is tendered after major technical decisions have already been made. 
Secondly, under co-development the integration of economic and technical imperatives arises 
from the incentives inherent in the method of remunerating the supplier. Because of the close 
relationship between all the players (payers and producers) involved in the development 
process, suppliers can be remunerated on the basis of concrete achievement benchmarks, 
rather than solely on the basis of accounting considerations formulated by the customer’s 
purchasing department. 
2. The methodology for evaluating co-development cost performance 
Our study is therefore comparative, evaluating the respective results of two projects: one 
carried out according to the traditional sub-contracting approach (TR project), and the other 
according to the conditioning factors described above (CD project). First of all, we will 
describe the three phases of the study conducted at the auto-maker’s. We will then present the 
survey conducted at the suppliers’. Our approach is differential: we have measured the 
performance differentials between TR and CD projects. Hypothetically, the profit/loss 
differential observed between the two projects can be attributed to the shift (in one case) to 
the co-development method. Both projects studied were very similar in terms of vehicle-
model, and economic assessments were made in constant French francs (base: year of TR 
project). Furthermore, the basis of comparison for aggregating data was the same. 
The effects of co-development on tool costs 
In order to evaluate Phase 1 performance, we measured, for all tools on Projects TR and CD, 
the differential between tool cost at the beginning of Phase 1 (or estimated cost) and cost of 
the same tools at the conclusion of Phase 1. The first cost corresponds to the initial technical 
evaluation of the tools. We call this “estimated cost,” and it serves as the basis for all of our 
measurements. Initial specifications for the tools are provided by the systems-engineers of 
Auto-Maker X: the customer knows how to specify the type of tools it wants to receive from 
the supplier. The same method of calculation—one widely recognized and employed by 
suppliers—was used to determine the two costs on both projects. Calculations that do not 
appear were made for research purposes by the methods department at Auto-Maker X. 
The effects of co-development on the negotiated price 
Due to large supplier commitment on the global performance of the development, the initial 
contract fixes globally the remuneration with special clauses dealing with modifications, as 
explained in the following section. The shift to co-development transforms negotiated pricing 
into effective remuneration for suppliers; whereas budget overruns were possible under the 
traditional system. Under the sub-contracting system, each modification became the subject of 
an amendment to the initial contract. Suppliers were free to negotiate a low initial price, since 
they knew they would have an opportunity to “hike it up” during the life of the project. We 
have measured the differentials between estimated tool costs and costs negotiated with 
suppliers for TR and CD Projects. 
The effects of co-development on modifications 
Modifications are not unique to the automotive industry, and are actually a feature of the 
learning process inherent in any industrial design project. The purpose of modifications is to 
correct a shortfall in product- or process-performance compared with the anticipated result. 
As the players involved learn about the vehicle (through testing, encountering problems, etc.), 
the original concept may prove vulnerable. Modifications can vary in importance: from the 
shift of an opening on a component, to a change in the overall style of the product. Budget 
overruns caused by modifications can reach 20% to 30% on a given project. For the auto-
maker, a major advantage of the shift to co-development is that modifications tend to be 
reduced in number. Modifications carried out during Phase 2 are the most costly. To embark 
on Phase 2 is to embark on the stage of project irreversibility, or project reversibility only at 
an extremely high cost. Tardy discovery of the need for modifications involves heavy 
additional costs, since at this stage the modifications must be made on the finished tools rather 
than on the preliminary designs. In other words, modifications can be very valuable during 
Phase 1, but are extremely costly during Phase 2. We have measured the value of Phase 2 
modifications as a percentage of estimated tool costs for TR and CD projects. 
The advantages and disadvantages generated by modification reduction are not the same for 
both parties to a co-development contract. Under the traditional sub-contracting system, 
modifications generate an average of 20% in additional revenues for suppliers. At this rate, 
modifications can make a crucial difference to suppliers during slack periods. The shift to co-
development is therefore a source of apparent loss for tool-makers. For the customers, 
however, the situation is reversed: under co-development, a reduction in modifications means 
a reduction in investment. In view of all this, how can the players involved in development 
projects be persuaded to identify the need for modifications early? How can suppliers be 
persuaded to forego a major source of revenue? 
The co-development project we studied provides a contractual response to these questions. In 
order to persuade suppliers to play the game of early modification identification, the co-
development contract includes (importantly) a clause specifying that no additional costs will 
be paid for late identification of the need for modifications. A comparison between the 
traditional and the co-development systems is quite illuminating in this regard. 
Table 1: Payment of modification costs for other than co-development projects 
 Phase 1 (low cost for 
unanticipated modification) 
Phase 2 (high cost for 
unanticipated modification) 
Originating with 
Customer  Customer  Customer  
Originating with 
Supplier Customer (1)  Customer (2) 
Under the sub-contracting system, Auto-Maker X is wholly responsible for modifications. 
Since under this system suppliers do not participate in the design phase of the project, here 
Phase 1 (1) modifications cannot originate with suppliers. During Phase 2, if the tool-makers 
suggest modifications, Auto-Maker X must pay the costs, since it bears sole responsibility for 
the design (2). 
Table 2: Payment of modification costs for co-development projects 
 Phase 1 (low cost for 
unanticipated modifications) 
Phase 2 (high cost for 
unanticipated modifications) 
Originating 
with Customer  Supplier (1)  Customer (3) 
Originating 
with Supplier Supplier (2)  Supplier (4)  
(1) During Phase 1, the cost of modifications originating with the customer is defrayed by the 
tool-maker without any change in the contract. Suppliers are thus encouraged to seek 
compensation for cost overruns generated by the maker (e.g.: style changes, modifications in 
the safety system, etc.). This compensation, which reflects an improvement in tool design, 
leads to a reduction in tool costs (e.g.: reduction in the number of tools per vehicle-model 
from five to three). This clause motivates suppliers to provide any expertise not possessed by 
the auto-maker at the earliest possible opportunity. The converse of this argument runs as 
follows: if the auto-maker were to pay for all the modifications originating with it, tool-
makers would not be motivated to compensate for them and would thus become less involved 
in the planning stages.2 This incentive system has already been observed at firm J by Aoki 
(1994), who maintains that the more auto-makers protect sub-contractors from risk, i.e. the 
more responsibility auto-makers assume for cost overruns resulting from modifications, the 
less incentive suppliers will have to pursue innovation on their own. 
(2) When suppliers pay the costs for Phase 1 modifications, they are encouraged to propose 
only those improvements that will result in lower tool costs. This is because, when suppliers 
lower the cost for tools during Phase 1, they improve their own profit margin, since they are 
contractually guaranteed payment at the price fixed during initial negotiation. Improvements 
originating with suppliers “go straight into the suppliers’ own pockets”. 
(3) Auto-makers have an incentive to identify needed modifications during Phase 1, since it is 
they who will pay during Phase 1. This is the only exception to the fixed-price nature of the 
contract. 
(4) When assuming total responsibility for tool design under co-development systems, 
suppliers pay the costs for all modifications originating with them. The high cost of Phase 2 
modifications acts as an incentive for identifying the need for modifications during Phase 1. 
To sum up: since all Phase 2 modifications represent increased costs for the party identifying 
the need for them, this acts as an incentive for early identification. During Phase 1, suppliers 
are motivated to reduce the costs of the tools for which they are responsible by improving 
their design. 
Measuring supplier performance 
The request that instigated our research, which was made by Auto-Maker X, created problems 
when it came to working with the suppliers. These suppliers were competing with each other 
and were conducting negotiations with Auto-Maker X at the time of the research. The 
problems were solved due to both the credibility previously established by the field researcher 
(Garel, 1994), and to lengthy discussions undertaken with each supplier. A questionnaire and 
survey agreement enabled each supplier to understand our study objectives, and to prepare for 
each of our visits. Our investigation sought to evaluate the effects of co-development on the 
strategy, organization, and resources (human, design, plant, etc.) of these firms; and on the 
customer/supplier relationship from the viewpoint of the suppliers (commercial negotiation, 
contract signing, work at the planning stage, etc.). Two studies devoted to Phase 2 
modifications for TR and CD projects and to the economic performances of these firms were 
also conducted. 
3. Results of the co-development performance measurement 
A reduction in tool costs 
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Co-development generated a 7% reduction in tool costs at the end of Phase 1, whereas the 
traditional sub-contracting system posted a cost overrun of 11%. A tool-by-tool study shows 
that the reduction for the CD project reflects improvement in tool design during Phase 1, i.e. 
during participation of suppliers at the planning stage. For example, Supplier A succeeded in 
improving the process for one lot of tools under the CD project by reducing the number of 
tools from 12 to 4, representing a cost reduction of 48%. By contrast, the TR project 
registered an increase in the complexity of the tooling process during Phase 1 due to problems 
with delivering pertinent expertise in a logical sequence during the planning stage; to the lack 
of an improvement-incentive clause; and to the absence of the suppliers’ own experts. We 
concluded that, under co-development, the Auto-Maker achieves savings equal to the cost 
overruns on the TR project, and that suppliers will increase their profit margins if they can 
reduce tool costs. 
An increase in the negotiated price 
For the two partners, what effect does co-development have on the negotiated tool price? It is 
clear that under co-development the auto-maker pays more for tools during the initial 
negotiation, since the suppliers must anticipate modifications and profit margins during a 
single negotiation, with no hope of renegotiation. In fact, under the CD project, negotiated 
tool prices were an average of 23% higher than initial costing or cost estimates. Under the TR 
project, the differential was 16% (discrepancy = 7%). For suppliers, this differential measures 
the cost of risks to come. Auto-Maker X did not, however, “push” the negotiation too hard for 
this initial co-development experiment under the CD project. 
A sharply reduced investment in modifications 
The number of Phase 2 modifications was significantly reduced. They accounted for 49% of 
estimated tool cost under the TR project, compared with only 15% under the CD project 
(delta = 34%). In other words, investment in modifications under co-development were 
divided by almost 3.5, the result of a major reduction in modification volume. This 
observation is unique in the history of the automotive industry. 
Table 3: Overall Co-Development Balance Sheet 
Auto-Maker Suppliers 
PROFITS LOSSES PROFITS LOSSES 
Phase 1 
Performance: 11% 
 
Reduction in 
modifications: 34% 
Non-renegotiation 
of contract: 7% 
 
Phase 1 
Performance: 7% 
 
Non-renegotiation 
of contract : 7% 
Reduction in 
modifications*: 0% 
 
Total : + 38% Total : + 14% 
* We agree with the suppliers in considering that the reduction in modifications constituted a 
net loss in revenues, compensated by advantages obtained in production management (plant-
flow equalization during Phase 2 was much easier, and production-times were shortened), and 
by the possibility of doing other business (income-generating business) during the time-period 
freed by modification reduction. Therefor, as a working figure, we have entered 0.  
Co-development is here the opposite of a no-win game. However, the aggregate-result effect 
conceals a genuine disparity. Only a supplier-by-supplier profit/loss breakdown (still in terms 
of the TR/CD differential) can provide the clear demonstration making further analysis 
possible (Table 4). 
Table 4: Co-development profit/loss matrix 
  Auto-Maker X Suppliers 
Supplier A Phase 1 Performance PROFIT: 18% PROFIT: 19% 
 Non-renegotiation of contract LOSS: 16% PROFIT: 16% 
 Modification reduction PROFIT: 23% - 
 TOTAL PROFIT: 25% PROFIT: 35% 
Supplier B Phase 1 Performance PROFIT: 10% PROFIT: 0.1% 
 Non-renegotiation of contract PROFIT: 1% LOSS : 1% 
 Modification reduction PROFIT: 25% - 
 TOTAL PROFIT: 36% LOSS: 0.9% 
Supplier C Phase 1 Performance PROFIT: 0% PROFIT: 4% 
 Non-renegotiation of contract LOSS: 6% PROFIT: 6% 
 Modification reduction PROFIT: 68% - 
 TOTAL PROFIT: 62% PROFIT: 10% 
Supplier D Phase 1 Performance PROFIT: 7% LOSS: 12% 
 Non-renegotiation of contract LOSS: 21% PROFIT: 21% 
 Modification reduction PROFIT: 17% - 
 TOTAL PROFIT: 3% PROFIT : 9% 
There is a clear differential in these results: between profits and losses, between profit levels, 
between customer and suppliers, and among the various suppliers. How can these be 
explained? 
4. Earning profits from the co-development situation 
Co-development is advantageous to those suppliers capable of developing their design 
expertise over the long term.  
Supplier expertise 
Tool-maker profitability during Phase 1 is heavily dependent on engineering expertise. We 
have noted and verified a strong positive correlation between supplier performance and 
supplier design-capacity as measured in a given supplier’s (1) human resources (Kay 1993; 
Grant 1991); (2) technological resources; and (3) organizational resources. 
Table 5: Selected data on supplier engineering-resources3 
Suppliers Engineering 
staff 
(studies, 
programming 
and 
simulation) 
Design 
staff as a 
% of 
firm’s total 
work force 
Total 
number of 
individuals 
qualified 
to 
participate 
in planning 
Existence 
of a 
project 
structure 
Digital 
Studies 
Rate of 
study sub-
contract-
ing 
Number of 
CAD / 
CAM 
work-
stations 
A base 100 base 100 base 100 yes yes average base 100 
B 33% 84% 20% yes yes  low 50% 
C 50% 123% 50% yes yes average 75% 
D 20% 130% 30% no no high 25% 
The Supplier B and D age-pyramids are relatively older than those of Suppliers A and C, a 
difference explained by the fact that design-department employees tend to be younger than 
those in other departments, and reflecting the considerable investment made by Suppliers A 
and C in a youthful and highly-qualified work force.4 These young recruits also reflect high 
technological investment in digitalization and simulation—heavy investments5 enabling these 
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4 It is nevertheless the most highly-qualified suppliers, and often those of longest-standing, who participated in the auto-
maker’s Phase 1 planning stage. It should also be noted that metal-stamping as a field has historically had a long tradition 
of apprenticeship. 
5 For example, apart from training costs, a fully-equipped 3-D CAD workstation costs approximately FF 300,000. 
suppliers to reduce design time and improve the management of unforeseen Phase 1 
modifications. 
Tool-Maker D has not developed a design department or planning facilities and, in the 
absence of a project team, this firm—small in size and European in scope—cannot offer co-
development expertise to its customers. Its design department has not been significantly 
modernized. Studies are not digital, and investments in CAD are low. Despite a large design 
staff in terms of percentage of total work force, Supplier D sub-contracts much of its design-
study work. However, this sub-contracting is poorly handled and creates a dependency 
situation for the tool-maker in relation to its own design-study suppliers.6 The lack of project 
structure has created coordination problems between customer and supplier. Supplier D is the 
only one which did not reap any advantages from participation in Phase 1, and modification 
reduction was negligible. In contrast to the operations carried out with Suppliers A, B, and C, 
the auto-maker’s engineers were forced to make trips during Phase 2 to the premises of tool-
maker D more often under the CD project than under the TR project, in order to compensate 
for this lack of skills (Table 6). Co-development revealed the structural weaknesses of this 
supplier. 
Table 6: Number of monthly visits to suppliers by Auto-Maker X representative during Phase 2 
Suppliers Non Co-Development Co-Development 
A 1 1 
B 4 1 
C 2 0.5 
D 0.5 2 
Tool-Maker B developed its design resources extensively for the planning stage, and also 
implemented a dedicated project structure. The design-department work force increased by 
150% over four years. This firm has concluded partnership contracts with outside 
design/planning consultants in order to strengthen its internal design resources. And, in order 
to help its partners adapt to the specifics of tool-making, the firm ultimately provided 
computer work-stations, software, and training programs for design-consultancy employees. 
Here, the dependency that holds Supplier D back has been addressed and remedied. (b) Over 
the past two years, Supplier B has gradually implemented a project structure cloned from that 
of Auto-Maker X. Internally, this project structure strengthens the relationship between the 
engineering and other departments. However, the performance of Tool-Maker B (overall loss 
of 0.9%) in the TR/CD comparison does not take into account the reorganization carried out 
following the CD project. The shift to co-development served as a strong incentive to this 
supplier to transform its structure and resources. 
Tool-Maker A is positioned as a complete service-provider from the design of auto-body 
components to their final assembly. This supplier earned a substantial profit from co-
development in the pre-production planning stage (profit of 35%). The firm developed its 
digital design and R&D departments extensively, and five years ago implemented a 
“heavyweight” project structure (Clark & Wheelwright 1992). Within the firm, organization 
according to project is a factor which promotes consistency. The project structure “holds 
together” all the investments and reorganizations by linking them to one another within a 
coherent system. It is also an attempt to duplicate the auto-maker’s own organization, thus 
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non-specificity is reflected in the tardy identification of problems, since Supplier D does not possess the means for 
verifying all sub-contracted design work. Here we see that in order to sub-contract effectively, knowledge of how the job 
should be done must already be possessed internally. Tardy identification of errors creates tensions in the relationships 
between the design consultancy and the tool-maker’s plant and are costly in terms of wasted time. 
facilitating the customer/supplier interface. Supplier C, like Supplier A, has been developing 
its engineering skills for many years. 
The ability to earn profits from participation in Phase 1 is thus strongly dependent on skills 
provided by the supplier. A skill-based approach puts the interpretation of performance in 
terms of incentives into perspective. Economic incentives are not in themselves sufficient to 
mobilize suppliers at the inception of a project. Although they positively affect both the early 
identification of required modifications and tool-cost reduction, profits are largely generated 
by tool-makers’ skills, and not merely by these economic incentives. No economic incentive 
can turn a “numskull” into a “genius”. Shifting economic responsibility onto the shoulders of 
the tool-maker is not enough; the means through which the tool-maker can assume this 
responsibility must also be provided by the organization. The way to do this is through 
participation in the planning stage, which gives credibility to the economic parameters. When 
the auto-maker invites its suppliers to participate in the project-planning stage, it gives them 
an opportunity to anticipate future project problems from the start. Economic incentives 
cannot be divorced from the organizational context in which they are operative. Economic 
incentives alone, therefore, are not enough to mobilize tool-makers at the design phase. Put 
another way, changes in organizational method will have little impact when not combined 
with changes in motivational method. 
The long-term stability of the co-development relationship 
Skills acquisition and investment by suppliers implies the extension of the inter-corporate 
relationship beyond a single project. Duration over time builds trust and develops learning. It 
also represents a guarantee of revenues, i.e. profit expectations are increased if the contract is 
renewed without subterfuge on either side. Suppliers will not undermine the interests of a 
customer that can guarantee steady revenues. Under the system of joint participation 
described by Imaï & Itami (1984), the two parties agree to renew their cooperative venture if 
each one has fulfilled its obligations. Game theory demonstrates that the duration of the 
relationship constitutes an incentive to cooperate. In a survey dealing with the American and 
Japanese car industries, Cusumano & Takeishi (1991) note that the relationship between 
contractors and auto-makers lasts for over ten years. For Donada & Kesseler (1997), the 
relationship between customer and supplier involved in co-development relationships today 
lasts for an average of 23 years. Co-development is conceived as a game that is continuously 
replayed, but its total lifespan is determined by results. Although co-development reflects a 
strategic change for Auto-Maker X, and although it involves a longer-lasting relationship than 
the traditional one for design sub-contracting, the customer still does not guarantee the 
supplier that it will be systematically selected for each new development. Behind this 
uncertainty, suppliers perceive a contradiction between, on one side, a coherent and 
motivating proposition from the Auto-Maker X management on partnerships with suppliers; 
and, on the other, organized debate within the firm on the desirability of an alternate method 
(“what if, ultimately, selection of the lowest bidder turned out to be the least costly 
solution?”). This vacillation worries suppliers. Co-development—and the commitment to 
long-term organization and investment it involves—requires a degree of stability in the 
organizational choices made by each of the partners. “Our investment strategies are strongly 
dependent on the continuation of a sustained volume of stable operations in the future” (all 
suppliers). In today’s context of drastic reduction in design costs by auto-makers, the pressure 
on suppliers at the time of negotiation is very strong. The cost factor, as a determinant in the 
selection of suppliers, is indeed an integral part of the inter-corporate cooperation system. The 
estimated/negotiated cost differential observed between TR and CD projects (+7%) is sharply 
reduced for projects coming after the initial CD project. This pressure on prices reduces 
revenues, affects supplier profit margins adversely, and over time raises the question of how 
long co-development can be sustained: “like other auto-makers, X requests a 20% reduction 
for each new project; the problem with a 20% reduction is how to maintain profit margins” 
(all suppliers). 
Duration does not depend solely on the amount of time allowed by the customer for the co-
development relationship. It is also a function of the co-development strategy of management 
and suppliers. What is the “strategic intention” (Hamel & Prahalad, 1989) of these managers 
in terms of co-development? “Strategy” is understood in this context as the fit an organization 
achieves between its own resources/skills and the opportunities/risks created by its external 
environment (Hofer & Schendel, 1978). The formulation of medium-term strategy is the only 
way to give coherence to the investment and organizational choices implemented by suppliers 
in the context of co-development. The tool-makers’ strategies are closely linked to the 
proportion of their revenues accounted for by Auto-Maker X. As it happens, Auto-Maker X is 
a major customer for the suppliers we studied. The only supplier-managers who failed to offer 
a strategic vision were those of Supplier D. They consider that the implementation of co-
development is “unnatural” since firms are not intended to cooperate, but to organize their 
relationship via the market. This supplier’s lack of project structure and investment in design 
skills reflects its lack of strategic perspective. By contrast, the investment of tens of millions 
of French francs in an ultra-modern plant, the development of engineering skills, the 
implementation of data systems, and the modernization of organizational systems at Supplier 
C reflect a strong strategic vision. 
Conclusion 
For an activity as strategically important as that described, co-development must be given 
comparative priority on the market. For the customer, co-development is the most efficient 
means to acquire a strategic resource which is not possessed by the firm itself. Under co-
development, it is crucial for the customer to have suppliers who can identify, analyse, and 
solve problems. Not all suppliers have the right stuff to be effective co-development partners. 
The suppliers that reap advantages from co-development are those that make a sustained 
investment in the resources—primarily non-material ones—that build design skills. These 
skills enable such suppliers to exploit the opportunity offered by the decision of Auto-Maker 
X to out-locate. However, the type of out-location we have studied is contingent on political 
and historical factors that may create new circumstances in which Auto-Maker X will be 
impelled to re-integrate the operation involved. But the behavior of competing auto-makers is 
also reversible: their own organizational costs may lead them to out-locate the design and 
production of stamping tools. Auto-Maker X may even push them to do so by having become 
a “teaching customer” (Garel, & Kesseler, 1998) for suppliers.  
Our study, closely focussed on machine tools for the automotive industry, leaves some 
consequences of co-development unexamined. For example, we have not studied the effects 
of this new organizational method on development time-frames, a major factor in the 
competition between firms developing new products. The development time-frame was 
shortened by over 10% between TR and CD projects, a tendency that accelerates with 
subsequent projects. Also unexamined are the effects of co-development on human-resource 
management (e.g.: stress and sometimes professional burn-out at the end of certain co-
development projects; the effect on the relationship between project teams of coexisting but 
differing modes of customer relations practiced within the same firm). Nor have we further 
examined the effects of co-development on the machine-tool suppliers market. Today we are 
witnessing a definite trend towards vertical integration (e.g.: Comau in Italy) reflecting 
demands for industrial competence from design through production; and towards a widening 
gap between the top-ranking suppliers (co-developers) and those below them. Inter-corporate 
cooperative efforts are redefining the frontiers of the firm itself (Garrouste, 1997), and are 
diversifying the nature of inter-organizational relationships. 
APPENDIX 
Below we present the calculation method, formulated ad hoc for our research purposes, used 
to arrive at the various differentials enabling us to measure co-development performance. 
With E1 = estimated cost, E2 = cost at end of Phase 1, E3 = negotiated price, E4 = cost of 
Phase 2 modifications. 
E1 = Est. cost
Time
E3 = Neg. price E2 = Cost end Phase 1
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∑(∑E4) in % of E1 
= modification reduction 
The above table was drawn up for both the CD and TR projects. The data on tables 3 and 4 in 
the body of the article show the differentials between the results obtained for each one of the 
projects (double-framed box in the above table). 
 
